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Yazzie v. EPA, 851 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2017)
Caitlin C. Buzzas
In Yazzie v. EPA, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the EPA’s
discretion in its adoption of a federal implementation plan under the
Clean Air Act for a coal-fired power plant on the Navajo Nation
Reservation that reduced power generation at the plant, imposed a cap on
total emissions of nitrogen oxides, and required that the plant cease coalfired power generation by end of 2044.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Yazzie v. EPA, tribal conservation organizations and non-profit
environmental organizations challenged the United States Environmental
Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) source-specific Federal Implementation
Plan (“FIP”) under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) for a coal-fired power plant
on the Navajo Nation Reservation in Arizona.1
The Ninth Circuit held that the federal government’s partial
ownership of the Navajo Generating Station (“Station”) “did not eliminate
any deference to the EPA’s interpretation of the CAA and its
implementing regulations.”2 The court stated that the EPA had reasonably
concluded that because the Navajo Nation had not submitted a Tribal
Implementation Plan (“TIP”), the Tribal Authority Rule (“TAR”) applied,
giving the EPA authority to implement a FIP at the Station.3 Moreover,
the court held that the EPA correctly interpreted the TAR and the CAA’s
Regional Haze Regulation to conclude that emission reductions did not
apply to FIPs for regional haze that are enacted in place of TIPs. The court
further stated that it was reasonable for the EPA to give an emission credit
to the Station when evaluating if the BART alternative resulted in greater
emission reductions, and therefore it deferred to the EPA in its
determination that the FIP alternative for nitrous oxide emissions was a
“better than BART” alternative.4
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Requirements and History of the CAA
Under the CAA, each state submits a State Implementation Plan
(“SIP”) to the EPA that sets forth emission limits to improve air visibility
under the Regional Haze Regulations.5 If a SIP is rejected or the State does
not submit one, the EPA must create a FIP to fill in any resulting regulatory
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gaps.6 A SIP must identify the “best available retrofit technology”
(“BART”) to reduce emissions from major emission sources.7 A State can
bypass a BART by enacting a “‘better than BART’” alternative.8 Under
the “better than BART” alternative for Regional Haze Regulations, a SIP
requires that the necessary emissions reductions “take place during the
first long-term strategy for regional haze” and “in no event later than five
years.”9 However, it is disputed whether this deadline applies to a FIP
enacted in place of a TIP under the TAR, rather than a SIP. 10 For tribes,
the EPA issued a special TAR which allows tribes to develop their own
TIP similar to a SIP.11 However, Tribes are not required to adopt a TIP, so
a TAR authorizes the EPA to enact a FIP to fill in gaps to meet emission
goals under the Regional Haze Regulations.12
Amendments to the CAA in 1990 expanded its focus to include
the visibility impairment caused by air pollutant emissions from
“numerous sources located over a wide geographic area,” known as
regional haze.13 To reach the goal of achieving natural visibility by 2064,
the CAA requests that each State submit a SIP to the EPA setting forth
“emission limits and other measures necessary to make reasonable
progress toward the national visibility goal.”14 SIPs must identify the
BART to reduce admissions, and any source subject to the BART must
install and operate the technology “as expeditiously as practicable” and
within five years after approval of a SIP or FIP.15 To circumvent the BART
with a “better than BART” alternative, the State’s SIP must have all the
necessary emission reductions taking place within the “first long-term
strategy” of the plan16 and show the alternative will achieve “greater
reasonable progress” than would have resulted from the BART.”17 There
are three different methods to show that an alternative will result in
“greater reasonable progress”:(1) “[i]f the distribution of emissions is not
substantially different than under BART, and the alternative measure
results in greater emission reductions”; (2) “if the distribution of emissions
is significantly different,” “dispersion modeling” must be conducted,
“which focuses on visibility rather than emissions”; or (3) “otherwise
based on the clear weight of the evidence.”18
The TAR arose from the CAA Amendments that authorized the
EPA to “treat Indian Tribes as States if certain conditions were met, and
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to issue regulations outlining when that treatment should occur.”19 The
TAR treats eligible tribes “in the same manner as States with respect to all
provisions” of the implementation of regulations under the CAA “except
for mandatory plan submittal deadlines.”20 Since Tribes are not required
to adopt TIPs, the EPA must implement “without unreasonable delay”
provisions to protect air quality in the absence of tribal provisions.21
However, the TAR exempts tribes from certain CAA requirements such
as specific visibility deadlines and allows the EPA more time to implement
a FIP for a tribe than a State because States are farther along in the
development, planning, and implementation of air quality expertise.22
B. The Navajo Nation Station’s FIP
The Station is the “largest coal-fired plant in the western United
States.”23 Its emission of nitrogen oxide (“NOx”) affects the visibility at
major national parks and wilderness areas including the Grand Canyon.24
The Station also powers a major water distribution system for Arizona and
is a significant employer and revenue generator for the Navajo Nation.25
Four utilities and the Department of Interior (through the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation) co-own the Station under a lease from the Navajo Nation.26
The Navajo Nation is barred from controlling or regulating the operation
of the Station under the lease.27 Under the proposed amended lease, the
Station would operate as is until 2044, after which the Navajo Nation could
continue its operation of the Station, but would have to do so as a “new
source” that generates electricity without coal.28
The Navajo Nation did not issue a TIP for the Station, so the EPA
issued a proposed FIP that offered both a BART determination and BART
alternative.29 The BART determination would reduce NOx emissions by
almost 80% within 5 years of the final FIP.30 The BART alternative
extended the deadline for NOx emission reductions to 2023 and gave an
“emission credit” for the Stations previous installation of low NOx
technology.31
After a supplemental proposal, the final rule imposed a lifetime
cap on NOx emissions (ending in 2044), reduced power generation,
finalized a longer deadline of emission reductions, and issued an emission

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id. at 966.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 967.
Id. at 965.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

4

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 0

credit.32 The EPA concluded that the plan qualified as a “better than
BART” alternative.33 In addition, the EPA stated that a “more flexible,
extended compliance schedule was warranted due to (1) the Station’s
unusual and significant challenges; and (2) the EPA’s discretion under the
TAR.”34
III. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the challenge to the EPA under the
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), which states that final agency
action shall be upheld unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.”35 This is a “highly
deferential” standard, with deference to an agency’s interpretation of an
administrative statute governed by two questions – “steps” – laid out in
Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., v. NRDC.36 The first step under Chevron looks at
whether Congress “addressed the precise question at issue.”37 If Congress
was unambiguous in its intent on the issue, then the court must give effect
to Congress’s express intent.38 If the statute is “silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue,” the court must look at “whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”39
Additionally, “an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is
controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”40
The court made its decision based on several factors including the
statutory BART deadlines required by the CAA, the eligibility of tribes to
be treated as States, the substantive and procedural deadlines of tribes
under the CAA, and if the FIP was a “better than BART alternative.”
A. BART deadlines required by the CAA
The Petitioners, Vincent Yazzie, and several tribal conservation
and non-profit environmental organizations, contended the EPA failed to
comply with the CAA statutory deadline that a BART must be
implemented within five years of “the promulgation of a FIP.”41 However,
the court found that the CAA’s five-year deadline did not apply because
the FIP proposed a “better than BART” alternative, and the deadline only
applies to BART.42
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B. Eligibility of Tribes to be treated as States
Petitioners also argued that because the Navajo Nation had
contracted its power to regulate the Station to the State, it was not
“eligible” for treatment as a State under TAR. 43 However, the court held
that the CAA “mentions nothing about a tribe’s eligibility” and applies “so
long as a tribe does not submit an approved TIP”.44 The court indicated
that the CAA authorizes the EPA to treat tribes as States if they meet
certain requirements,45 which includes a reasonable expectation that tribes
are “capable, in the judgement of [the EPA], of carrying out the functions
to be exercised in a manner consistent with the terms and purposes” of all
applicable regulations.46 Additionally, the court highlighted that if the
EPA determines that treating tribes the same as States is “inappropriate or
administratively infeasible” the EPA may provide other means by which
it “will directly administer such provisions so as to achieve the appropriate
purpose.”47 This, the court found, the EPA did through the TAR provision,
which provides that the EPA shall provide Federal implementation plans
that “are necessary or appropriate to protect air quality . . . if a tribe does
not submit a tribal implementation plan . . . or does not receive EPA
approval . . . .”48 Further, the court found that under an additional provision
of the CAA the EPA is authorized “to adopt a FIP when a tribe is not
treated as a State.”49 Therefore, the court held that the EPA had correctly
applied the TAR because the Navajo Nation had not submitted a TIP, and
the EPA had authority to implement a FIP for NOx emissions at the
Station.50
C. Application of CAA Substantive or Procedural deadlines to Tribes
The Petitioners argued that the EPA’s interpretation of the
language and purpose of the CAA is incorrect and any flexibility under the
TAR only applies to procedural or submission deadlines, not substantive
or compliance deadlines.51 The EPA contended that the Navajo Nation
Station was not subject to this deadline because it only applies when a
State adopts a BART alternative, 52 and under the TAR, tribes are exempt
from “[s]pecific visibility implementation plan submittal deadlines” under
the CAA.53 Moreover, the EPA argues that the TAR entitles it to establish
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different deadlines for the FIP and the deadline here is “explicitly tied to
the period of the first long-term strategy” which States had to submit by
2007, but tribes were not subject to.54
The court looked to the Tenth Circuit decision in Arizona Public
Service Co. v. United States EPA which held that “TAR only excused
tribes from meeting procedural requirements” and that “[n]othing in the
TAR requires the FIP to comply with the regional haze deadlines
applicable to a SIP.”55 Further, the court stated that it could not say that
the EPA’s interpretation of its own regulation was erroneous or
inconsistent.56 The court held that “the EPA reasonably interpreted the
TAR . . . and the Regional Haze Regulations . . . to conclude that the
emission reductions deadline . . . does not apply to FIPs for regional haze
that are promulgated in place of TIPs.”57
D. The EPA FIP Alternative is “Better than BART”
The Petitioners next contended that the EPA failed to show “by
the clear weight of evidence” that the alternative achieved greater progress
than BART.58 Of the three different methods to show a “better than
BART” alternative the EPA relied on the first method – that the
“distribution of emissions” was not substantially different than BART and
the alternative resulted in “greater emission reductions.”59
The court found that the “clear weight of the evidence” standard
only applied to the third method, and the EPA chose the first method.60
The court reasoned that there are “three separate methods” to establish
that an alternative is “better than Bart” and that the State can either use the
two quantitative measures in the first method or the qualitative method in
the third.61 The first method does not incorporate the “clear weight of
evidence” standard, and thus the court found that the EPA was only
required to show “distribution of emissions” was “not substantially
different” and the alternative would result in “greater emission
reductions.”62 Similarly, the court noted that the EPA did not have to
conduct visibility modeling required under the second method.63
The Petitioners stated that the EPA did not meet the first prong of
the method because “distribution of emissions” should include both
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geographic and temporal distribution.64 The court indicated that the plain
language of the regulation under the first method does not indicate whether
the “distribution of emissions” is geographic (i.e., locations/sources of the
emissions), temporal (i.e., the timing of the emissions) or both.65 However,
the EPA has consistently interpreted “distribution of emissions” to refer
only to the geographic distribution of emissions.66 Thus, the EPA
concluded that the distribution of emissions between BART and the FIP’s
BART alternative was not substantially different because geographic
distribution of emissions is similar as they both apply to the same source
– the Station.”67 Additionally, the EPA noted this interpretation was
reasonable as where there is only one source being regulated – as is case
here – if emissions are reduced, visibility is improved.68 The court held
that the BART alternative regulatory deadline does not apply to an FIP
enacted under the TAR as the key inquiry is whether the EPA is required
to consider timing in evaluating the “distribution of emissions” prong.69
Further, the court stated that it “must defer to the EPA’s interpretation.”70
The Petitioners additionally argued that the FIP’s BART
alternative did not meet the second prong of the first method because it did
not result in “greater emission reductions”.71 The BART alternative
incorporated an emission credit for the Station’s voluntary instillation of
NOx reducing technology.72 “Absent this credit the BART alternative
would not achieve greater NOx reductions than BART.”73 Therefore, the
question was if it was reasonable for the EPA to give the Station an
emission credit when evaluating if the BART alternative resulted in
greater emission reductions.74 The Petitioners argued that the
incorporation of the credit into the alternative calculation was inconsistent
with the EPA’s prior statement on the BART and therefore was
unreasonable.75 They further argued that the EPA was inconsistent in
factoring the emission credit in computing the emission reductions under
BART.76 However, the EPA did not consider the credit in the BART
determination, but only for evaluating alternatives to BART.77 Therefore,
the EPA’s incorporation of the credit was not inconsistent with its prior
statement.78 Moreover, the TAR gave the EPA discretion to allow a credit
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for the BART alternative.79 The Court held that the TAR grants the EPA
wide latitude to determine what plan provisions are necessary to protect
air quality for a source on tribal lands when there is no TIP. 80 Therefore,
it was reasonable for the EPA to give the Station an emission credit when
evaluating if the BART alternative resulted in greater emission reductions
and it deferred to the EPA’s reasonable determination that the FIP
alternative was “better than BART.”81
IV. CONCLUSION
The outcome of Yazzie v. United States EPA affirms the Ninth
Circuit’s decision to give an entity more flexibility in complying with
regulations if those decisions are entitled to the implementing Agency’s
deference. The court held that the EPA did not abuse its discretion when
it adopted a FIP under the Clean Air Act for a coal-fired power plant on
the Navajo Nation Reservation that reduced power generation at the
plant, imposed cap on total emissions of nitrogen oxides, and required
that the plant cease conventional coal-fired power generation by end of
2044. Additionally, the court took into account the Station’s voluntary
compliance technology, the tribe’s interests in the Station, and that the
Station would cease to use coal at all in the future as factors in deciding
the discretion allowed by the EPA. The Ninth Circuit denied the petitions
stating that “In light of the discretion that the EPA enjoys, we cannot
conclude that, under these unique circumstance, the EPA acted arbitrarily
and capriciously.82
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